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By THOMAS H. MEEKER*
It has been over five years since I assumed the position of
President and Chief Executive Officer of Churchill Downs. Prior
to my arrival, I imagined Churchill Downs in terms of a bright
spring day, mint juleps, 130,000 racing fans waiting to sing "My
Old Kentucky Home" and the twin spires, the hallmark of the
track. Those continue to be the images of the rich tradition of
Churchill Downs, the home of the Kentucky Derby. However, I
saw none of them when I arrived at Churchill on a hot day in
July 1984.
A paltry crowd of about four thousand came that day to see
races with as few as four horses running for a top purse of ten
thousand dollars. The patrons gathered in a facility that was run-
down and in need of substantial repairs. The track had experi-
enced a net operating loss in 1983, and the downward trend was
continuing in 1984. Due to the company's poor financial perform-
ance, dwindling attendance, and declining handle,' the cadre of
employees who greeted the customers were more concerned about
job security than customer service. The track had lost its position
as an industry leader, and, aside from the Kentucky Derby, the
future looked bleak for Churchill Downs.
I soon learned that what had happened at Churchill Downs
had happened throughout the racing industry. Racing had found
a low point in its history and that is how I was introduced to the
* President, Churchill Downs, Inc. B.S. Northwestern University, 1965; J.D. University
of Louisville, 1973.
1 "Handle" is a term used to describe the total amount wagered on a race or races. It
is synonymous with the term "sales" in the lottery industry.
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sport. I never imagined that the racing industry was in such chaos,
nor did I realize that the industry was on the threshold of positive
and dramatic change. Now, after five years at the track, I have
a clearer vision of Churchill Downs and the racing industry. The
future looks brighter today, but significant challenges remain.
To understand where racing is today and where it is going in
the future, it is helpful to trace how it reached its low point.
There are a number of factors that played a role in racing's
downturn, but the greatest contributor was the failure of the
industry to aggressively respond to changes in the competitive
environment.
Racing has been a part of the American culture from colonial
times. The first American race was run on the plains of Hemp-
stead, New York in 1668.2 The British governor of New York,
Colonel Richard Nichols, ordered that races be run at regular
intervals so that the speed and stamina of the American horse
could be improved. Racing grew as a sport, but racing also
became very much a part of the legalized gaming industry. For
years, racing held a monopolistic position in many states where
gaming was authorized. Without any significant competition in
most states, racing prospered through the years and grew to be
one of America's leading pastimes. 3 By 1970, things began to
change.
The 1970's presented several problems for the racing industry.
Like any industry, a soft economy and high inflation threatened
racing's bottom line. Construction had nearly ceased and track
operators began to defer capital investment and maintenance ex-
penditures until better times. Racetracks had become, or were
fast becoming, dark and dingy tombs that were unattractive to
both current customers and any potential new customers.
Also in the 1970's, new forms of competition began to appear.
Casinos opened in Atlantic City threatening east coast racing.
Cable television began offering expanded sports coverage, and
state lotteries became more prevalent. In 1970, there were only
two state lotteries (New Hampshire and New York) with combined
sales of $49.2 million. By 1988, there were twenty-seven state
lotteries with combined sales of $15.0 billion, a remarkable growth
2 MEncE, DowN ran STRETCH, THE STORY OF COLONEL M.TT J. WINN 19 (1944).
Not until 1984 did baseball overtake racing as the sport with the highest annual
attendance in the United States.
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of 30,487%. 4 Since 1988, five more states, including Kentucky,
have started lotteries and more are on the way.
Late in the 1970's and continuing into the 1980's, another
phenomenon began to appear. Racing associations, under pressure
from horsemen and state racing commissions, started to expand
racing days. 5 This was done with the view towards increasing the
handle thereby increasing state tax revenues and horsemen's
purses. 6 The expansion of racing days did produce larger handles
but the increases did not offset increased expenses incurred by
the racetracks. For instance, in 1983 and 1984, Churchill Downs
expanded from 79 racing days to 117. The company lost $3 million
before returning to the traditional 79 day race program in 1985.
The expansion of racing days altered traditional racing cir-
cuits, creating a shortage of horses and intensifying competition
for quality horses among racetracks conducting simultaneous
meets. Changes in the breeding industry also contributed to the
shortage of quality horses. In the early 1980's stud fees and
yearling prices reached record levels as foreign investors, Arab
interests in particular, entered the market. Owners moved cham-
pion horses from the racetrack to breeding farms where a suc-
cessful stallion or mare could generate millions of dollars. The
attraction of these breeding dollars cost the racing industry many
of its stars, generally when the horses reached the age of four.
Aside from prestigious races such as the Kentucky Derby, the
only way to compete for quality horses was to increase purses.
With declines in handle at most racetracks, however, this was a
significant challenge. The industry axiom "money makes the mare
go round" was never more true than in the 1980's. Racetrack
operators searched for ways to increase purses and found two
sources: legislative relief and corporate sponsors.
With strong lobbying from racetrack operators and horsemen,
legislatures across the country began reducing parimutuel taxes.
For many tracks, these reductions provided the only means for
survival. In Kentucky, Ellis Park and Turfway Park obtained a
tax reduction from 4.75% to 1.50%. 7 In 1986, Kentucky's largest
4 Lo=Ry FACTS, GAmo & WAGMUNG Busiwss 20 (March 15, 1989).
5 In 1970, there were 6,242 racing days in the U.S. By 1988, there were 8,488, an
increase of 36%. THs AmmucN RAcING M uAL 218 (1989).
6 It is important to note that state taxes and horsemen's purses are computed as a
percentage of handle, not as a percentage of admission, parking, concession, or program
revenues that are directly tied to attendance.
7 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 138.510 (Bobbs-Merril 1988).
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racetracks, Churchill Downs and Keeneland, obtained a 1% tax
reduction that was applied exclusively to purses.8
In the early 1980's, racing began to court corporations with
a view towards selling race sponsorships. Several companies such
as Budweiser, Phillip Morris (Marlboro), and Jim Beam became
named sponsors of major races. The first one million dollar purse
was offered in the Budweiser Million at Arlington Park Race-
course in 1981. 9 By 1988, there were fifteen races with purses of
one million dollars or more and several million dollar bonuses
paid for winning a series of races. 10 In 1987, Chrysler Motors
became the sponsor of the Triple Crown Challenge, which guar-
antees the owner of a horse that wins the Kentucky Derby, the
Preakness Stakes, and the Belmont Stakes a purse of five million
dollars.
With the increase in purses and a decline in the sales prices
of thoroughbreds, the lure of the breeding farm subsided and
today we see such equine stars as Alysheba, Ferdinand, and
Winning Colors competing on the racetrack after their three-year-
old campaigns. However, the competition for quality horses re-
mains one of the key problems for racetrack operators.
The rate of change within the racing industry accelerated
during the mid-1980's and the entire industry continued to strug-
gle to gain a foothold in the new competitive environment. No-
where was this more evident than at Churchill Downs, where the
new management team was confronted with myriad challenges.
When we arrived in August 1984, the track was about to end
its second and final summer race meeting. The expansion of racing
days had driven daily average attendance and handle to new lows.
It was readily apparent that changes needed to be made and with
some degree of urgency. The newly organized management team
commenced the development of a business plan that would re-
position the company in the industry and the community. The
ultimate plan involved three simple strategies. First, the entire
marketing program was to be restructured around the concept of
developing Churchill Downs as a year-round entertainment facil-
ity. Second, a capital improvement program was to be developed
that would allow the track to be competitive with other entertain-
ment venues and also serve as an industry leader in racetrack
8Id.
9 Renamed Arlington International Racecourse in 1989.
10 See supra note 5, at 78.
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design. Third, and perhaps most important, a community rela-
tions program was to be developed that would improve the com-
pany's public image. Each of these strategies worked and continue
to be the cornerstones of our business plan for the future.
The marketing program was developed in conjunction with
the capital improvement program, and together they represented
a true paradigmatic shift, a transformation in the way of thinking
about our business. For years, Churchill Downs had been mar-
keted as a racetrack that was the home of the Kentucky Derby.
Capital improvements and marketing efforts were focused on the
Derby and little attention was paid to other days of racing, other
products that could be developed as revenue sources, or the
potential of using the track during the off-season.
The marketing program first identified products within three
general groupings-sports, gaming, and entertainment. Next,
market demands where new products could be developed were
identified, and, finally, delivery of quality customer service be-
came a focus. This marketing program also dictated how capital
expenditures were to be spent and where personnel resources were
to be committed.
As we inventoried our array of products, it became clear that
none were competitive. Our racing program, the showcase of the
equine athlete, was suffering from short fields and a lack of
quality horses. Purses had to be increased for the program to
become competitive. With the help of a one percent reduction in
the pari-mutuel tax and the addition of several corporate race
sponsorships, purses increased and the racing program came alive.
In 1984, the average daily purse distribution at Churchill Downs
was $92,893. By 1988, the average daily purse distribution rose
to $183,052. The addition of a three million dollar turf course
also aided in the attraction of an assemblage of new horses. These
efforts produced dramatic results reflected by the increased num-
ber of horses running in the races and the quality of the fields.
As the purses drew larger and more competitive fields, the handle
increased, which in turn created even more money for purses.
Our gaming products also had grown stale. With the advent
of the lottery, the public's appetite for high payoffs intensified.
Patrons became willing to risk more dollars to win larger payoffs.
In response to this demand, new wagering combinations were
introduced that would produce higher payoffs. These included:
exactas (pick the first and second place finishers in order), the
pick six (pick the first place finishers in six races) and the pick
1989-90]
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three (pick the first place finishers in three races). Again, the
results were impressive. An example is the pick-six pool of
$1,362,000 that occurred in 1987. For five days, there were no
winning tickets on the pick-six pool and the pool was carried over
to the following day. As the pool became larger, so did the
attendance and handle. Finally, on Saturday, a crowd of 28,396
attended the races and wagered $3,382,557. There were three
winners who received $396,958 each, the largest payoff in the
history of the track. On a normal day our attendance would have
been 16,507 and they would have wagered $2,195,030.
We also discovered that there was little entertainment oppor-
tunity provided at the track outside of pure gaming. There were
no facilities or activities at the track that attracted anyone except
the ardent horse-player. Consistent with the industry at large, our
patrons had grown older and were predominantly male. We needed
to attract a broader demographic mix. Under the capital improve-
ment program, we endeavored to develop areas on the track that
would satisfy the entertainment demands of the new demographic
segments. A private turf club was built for corporate entertain-
ment and for those patrons who wanted exclusivity. On the other
hand, Silks, a bar with entertainment, was created for the younger
people who wanted a casual setting during and after the races. In
virtually every corner of the track, new facilities were added that
created added comfort for our customers and that could be used
by the track for off-season events.
Through an intense training program, the employees of the
track came to realize that they were in the entertainment business
and that the primary means of achieving a competitive edge was
by delivering quality customer service. Each of the employees
came to understand the relationship of customer service to the
success of the company and their own job security. Today, our
employees take great pride in their performance, appreciate the
competitive challenges that confront our business, and are actively
involved in the development of new ideas to improve the level of
customer service.
The community relations program developed in 1984 was a
critical element of the overall effort to reposition the company.
For years, Churchill Downs had little contact with the community
except during Derby week. Reestablishing community contact called
for the involvement of the company and its employees in civic
and charitable activities. It also involved the company's financial
support of activities designed to improve the community's quality
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of life. Gradually, Churchill Downs became involved in all aspects
of community affairs.
The community relations program produced better results than
expected. Churchill Downs gained a reputation as a good corpo-
rate citizen. More important, community leaders and public of-
ficials came to accept the fact that the track is a vital asset for
the community in terms of jobs and tourism. This positive image
facilitated better relations with regulatory authorities, neighbors,
and our patrons. Recently, city officials announced a plan calling
for the redevelopment of the area surrounding the track. Such
support would not have been possible five years ago.
As a postscript, the revitalization of Churchill Downs has
been mirrored, more or less, throughout the entire racing indus-
try. Tracks like Ellis Park, Turfway Park, River Downs, Garden
State Park, and Arlington International Racecourse have com-
pleted extensive capital improvement programs. Recently, Arling-
ton International Racecourse reopened in Chicago after a disastrous
fire in 1985. A facility costing in excess of $120 million has
replaced the old clubhouse and grandstand. Arlington's emphasis
on customer service is perhaps the strongest in the country, and
this is reflected in their attendance and handle.
Now, let us look at the future of the racing industry in a
growing and increasingly competitive environment. There is no
question that the racing industry is on much sounder footing than
it was ten years ago. However, racing is still not keeping pace
with its competitors in the gaming industry. Between 1982 and
1988, legal and illegal wagering grew 67%,11 better than the growth
in personal income, which increased by only 52.1%.12 Yet, pari-
mutuel wagering on horse racing increased only 14%. Racing is
continuing to lose market share in the growing gaming industry.
What can racing do to compete more effectively in the future?
While not exhaustive, three strategies deserve consideration. First,
the racing industry must adopt an aggressive marketing strategy
that, at a minimum, identifies changes in market demand as
quickly as possible. The industry also must make better use of its
operating assets. Perhaps racetracks should be designed as mul-
" CHRISIANSEN, 1988 U.S. GROSS ANNUAL WAGER, GAmING & WAGESUNG BustNSS, 18,
21 (July 15, 1989).
22 United States Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of




tiple use facilities so that during the off-season a return can be
obtained from otherwise dormant assets. The marketing strategy
must also focus on the entertainment value associated with at-
tending races. Finally, entertainment opportunities must be made
available to a broad demographic base.
On an individual basis, track operators must adopt a time-
based marketing strategy. Time-based competition is a growing
practice among successful companies and requires the capability
to introduce new products more quickly and be more responsive
to market demands than a competitor. This strategy is based in
part on the traditional profit impact of market strategy (PIMS)
theory. This theory maintains that the first to the market with a
new product will obtain 50% of the market. The second to the
market will get 250o. The third will obtain 12.500 and so forth. 13
A company adopting this strategy must be willing to accept the
fact that change will be constant as new products are developed
to meet changing market demands.
Lotteries are good examples of time-based competitors. Lot-
teries are constantly testing the market place for market demands
and introducing new products to meet those demands. For in-
stance, the Oregon lottery recently introduced a sports betting
game based on the results of National Football League games.
The Kentucky lottery quickly attempted to follow suit, but was
stopped by the intervention of Governor Wallace Wilkinson. Rac-
ing, on the other hand, has generally responded, not to market
demands, but to the actions of its competitors, most often the
lotteries. For instance, the introduction of new wagering combi-
nations did not occur until racing was faced with the large prizes
offered by lotteries.
A second strategy for racing in the future is to expand the
distribution system for its gaming products. It is hard to believe
that the racing industry can compete with the lotteries, which
have a distribution system involving thousands of agents, by
selling its gaming products from a single location. This inherent
advantage of the lotteries is, in most states, preserved by statutes
prohibiting wagering at off-track locations.
Recently, the industry has been experimenting with various
forms of simulcasting as a means to expand the distribution
system. Simulcasting involves sending a television signal of a live
13 For a detailed discussion of time-based competition, see S. DAvis, FuTuRE PERFECT
(1988).
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race from the running track to another location within or without
a state. Variations on the simulcasting theme include intertrack
wagering (ITW),14 off-track betting (OTB), 1" and telephone ac-
count betting (TAB). 16
Care must be taken by racetracks before implementing any of
these systems. This is particularly true if a system is allowed to
operate in an existing racing market. If located within an existing
market, an alternative wagering site operates as competition for
the on-track race patron and, as such, on-track revenues are
threatened. The increase in handle from the alternative wagering
sites may or may not offset the loss in on-track, non-parimutuel
revenues associated with admissions, concessions, parking, and
programs.
ITW is a strategy that assumes that a greater penetration can
be made in an existing racing market by giving the patron more
access to wagering. In Kentucky and in other states operating in
this configuration, ITW has produced aggregate handle increases,
but at the expense of significant declines in on-track attendance. 7
Accordingly, track operators have been less impressed with the
results of ITW than state racing commissions and horsemen who
reap the benefit of the increases in handle.
The long-term effect of a reduction in on-track attendance is
of great concern to many people in the industry. The sport of
live racing, with its color, pageantry, and excitement, is racing's
primary and distinguishing product. This product is not available
through the purchase of a lottery ticket at a gas station or a
mutuel ticket at an alternative wagering site. If racing becomes a
pure gaming operation centered on an ITW, OTB, or TAB sys-
tem, it is likely that several tracks will cease live racing. The
expenses of running a live race meeting can be avoided by simply
14 ITW is a configuration where the receiver of the signal is another racetrack that may
or may not be conducting racing operations. If the operations are intrastate, all the wagers
made on the receiving track are combined with the sending track's pool. In an interstate
configuration, the receiving track operates a separate pool and separate payoffs are calculated.
Is OTB is a configuration where the receiver of the signal is simply a betting shop. This
system was first instituted in the state of New York in 1971. Today, there are several states
that authorize OTB operations.
16 TAB is a configuration where a person can wager by telephone using money previously
deposited on account with the track. Generally, it also involves delivery of a television signal
of the live race.
17 For an analysis of the effects of ITW in New Jersey, see R. T"ALsmm, AN ANALYsis
OF INTRA-STATE INTERTRACK WArEwING iN NEw J aSEy-A CAsE STUDY (October 16, 1989)
(unpublished, University of Louisville Equine Industry Program).
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importing a simulcast signal from an operating track. Today,
several smaller tracks throughout the country are employing this
tactic to fill out live racing programs. If this trend continues, the
need for horses will be reduced, jobs associated with the caring
and training of these horses will be lost, the breeding industry's
market will be eroded, and the very character of the sport will be
altered. Horses could become nothing more than roulette balls,
the means of determining the winner of a wager.
Of the systems currently under consideration, OTB and TAB,
properly configured to protect existing racing operations, appear
to have the greatest potential for growth in the industry's market.
These systems allow a racetrack to expand its operations into new
markets where racing does not exist. Conversely, ITW seeks to
expand an existing racing market much like we saw with the
attempt to expand racing days. Generally, the expansion of racing
days hurt the racetracks.
Racetracks have learned one valuable lesson over the years.
Any alternative wagering system must be controlled by the race-
tracks. New York's attempt is regarded as an example of how
not to do it. In New York, a mature, statewide OTB system is in
existence. The system is operated by various governmental bodies,
not the racetracks. The result has been that OTB shops are located
on the doorsteps of most racetracks in the state. A more enlight-
ened approach may be found in Illinois, where the racetracks
control the OTB operations. 1 8
A third strategy meriting consideration is the establishment of
a national organization responsible for coordinating racing activ-
ities throughout the country. Today, each state, through a racing
commission, controls the assignment of racing dates and regulates
all of the activities of racetracks within the jurisdiction. Unlike
other professional sports, there is no commissioner who schedules
games, negotiates with players, and generally supervises the over-
all activities of the league. Absent this kind of central coordina-
tion, racetracks will not be able to create racing circuits reducing
the shortage of quality racing stock, to maintain a uniform se-
curity program directed at maintaining the integrity of the sport,
and to develop a national recognition of our sport through ad-
vertising and public relations. The time has come for racing to
collectively market its products as an entity, much like Major
" ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 8, 37-28(h) (1988).
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League Baseball, the National Football League, and the National
Basketball Association. There are a number of national organi-
zations that attempt to perform some of these functions but, to
date, none has been successful in exercising control over the entire
industry. Given the politics involved among the members of the
industry, such a goal may be impossible to achieve.
The changes I have witnessed since joining the racing industry
have been impressive and have substantially improved our sport.
Today, we see a sport that is characterized by aggressive manage-
ment, innovative marketing, increased television exposure, and
significant capital infusion. The question for the future will be
whether racing will be able to capitalize on these assets and react
to changes in the competitive marketplace in an aggressive, risk-
taking, and more timely manner than it has in the past. That
certainly is the intent of the management of Churchill Downs.

